[ABE-L] Ciclo de Seminários do PPGE/2026.1
'Francisco Cysneiros' via abe-l@ime.usp.br
abe-l em ime.usp.br
Seg Jun 15 10:40:16 -03 2026
Corrigindo
17 de junho de 2026
Em seg., 15 de jun. de 2026 às 10:35, Francisco Cysneiros <
cysneiros em de.ufpe.br> escreveu:
> Ciclo de Seminários do PPGE/2026.1
>
>
> Temos o prazer de anunciar que, no dia 20 de maio de 2026,
> o seminário será ministrado pelo Dr. Henrique Santos
>
>
>
>
> Título: Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Strategies in Product Warranty
> Pricing: A Hierarchical Game Approach Palestrante: Dr. Henrique Santos (Pós
> doutorando, UFPE)
>
> Data e horário: Quarta-feira, 17/06/2026, às 16h (GMT-03)
>
> Local: Auditório Prof. Ruy Luis Gomes, sala 347 (*Auditório do DE*),
>
> Departamento de Estatística - CCEN – UFPE
>
> --
>
> Título: Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Strategies in Product Warranty
> Pricing: A Hierarchical Game Approach Palestrante: Dr. Henrique Santos (Pós
> doutorando, UFPE) Abstract
> This paper analyzes the pricing dynamics of product warranties by
> developing a three-player hierarchical game model involving a manufacturer,
> an independent service agent, and a consumer. The model provides a scenario
> where the manufacturer and the agent form a coalition to coordinate pricing
> strategies, while interacting non-cooperatively with the consumer. In this
> framework, the manufacturer sets the product’s sale price, including the
> base warranty, while the agent determines the price of extended maintenance
> services. The key contribution is the application of the Shapley value to
> equitably distribute the coalition’s profits based on each member’s
> contribution—a novel approach in the warranty pricing literature. We detail
> the characteristic functions that define the coalition’s structure and
> present computer simulations to estimate the expected costs associated with
> maintenance services. A comprehensive sensitivity analysis is applied to
> report how changes in parameters influence equilibrium strategies and
> players’ payoffs. The results provide strategic insights into how
> manufacturers and agents can coordinate to optimize pricing, capture
> consumer surplus, and improve decision-making in warranty service markets.
> Keywords: hierarchical game theory; product warranty; pricing strategy;
> cooperative game; non-cooperative game; Shapley value; manufacturer–agent
> coalition; service contracts; game-theoretic modeling; consumer surplus
>
> Francisco José A. Cysneiros
> Full professor
> Departament of Statistics - UFPE
> Co-Director of Department of Statistics, UFPE 2005-2009
> Co-Director of Graduate Studies, Statistics, UFPE 2009-2013
> Director of Graduate Studies, Statistics, UFPE 2013-2017
> Co-Director of Graduate Studies, Statistics, UFPE 2026-2028
> Editor in Chief of Brazilian Journal of Probability and Statistics
> My URLs:
> www.de.ufpe.br/~cysneiros <http://www.de.ufpe.br/~cysneiros>
> http://150.161.44.6/cysneiros
>
> Lattes:
>
> *ResearchedID:*
> *Publons:*
> http://lattes.cnpq.br/1313497098151734
> http://www.researcherid.com/rid/G-6333-2012
> https://publons.com/a/1540091
> ORCID: http://orcid.org/0000-0001-6757-6969
>
>
> Description: Enter a Description
> <https://www.researcherid.com/ProfileGet.action?focus=description>
>
>
--
Francisco José A. Cysneiros
Full professor
Departament of Statistics - UFPE
Co-Director of Department of Statistics, UFPE 2005-2009
Co-Director of Graduate Studies, Statistics, UFPE 2009-2013
Director of Graduate Studies, Statistics, UFPE 2013-2017
Co-Director of Graduate Studies, Statistics, UFPE 2026-2028
Editor in Chief of Brazilian Journal of Probability and Statistics
My URLs:
www.de.ufpe.br/~cysneiros <http://www.de.ufpe.br/~cysneiros>
http://150.161.44.6/cysneiros
Lattes:
*ResearchedID:*
*Publons:*
http://lattes.cnpq.br/1313497098151734
http://www.researcherid.com/rid/G-6333-2012
https://publons.com/a/1540091
ORCID: http://orcid.org/0000-0001-6757-6969
Description: Enter a Description
<https://www.researcherid.com/ProfileGet.action?focus=description>
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