<html> <head> <meta content="text/html; charset=utf-8" http-equiv="Content-Type"> </head> <body text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF"> Ola Silvio, Até pouco tempo eu achava que ter o comprovante de papel seria confiável. Mas se o software não é, porque o comprovante imprimido pelo software seria? O software pode imprimir o que você digitou mas somar outra coisa para o Boletin de Urna. Já foi sugerido aqui na lista que ter o software como open source, como na Australia, e' melhor que ter o comprovante de papel: custo zero e confiavel. No FAQ a partir do link <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.elections.act.gov.au/elections_and_voting/electronic_voting_and_counting">http://www.elections.act.gov.au/elections_and_voting/electronic_voting_and_counting</a> eles dizem porque: "<a title="Open" href="http://www.elections.act.gov.au/elections_and_voting/electronic_voting_and_counting/faq#">Does the system print out a copy of my vote?</a> <div style="display: block;" class="expandcollapsediv"> No. There is no need to print a copy of any votes. The <a target="_blank" class="external" href="http://www.legislation.act.gov.au/a/1992-71/default.asp">Electoral Act 1992</a> does not provide for a "paper trail" of electronic votes cast. This is not required as the software for the voting and counting systems has been rigorously <a href="http://www.elections.act.gov.au/elections_and_voting/electronic_voting_and_counting/development_of_the_system">tested</a>, independently <a href="http://www.elections.act.gov.au/elections_and_voting/electronic_voting_and_counting/development_of_the_system">audited</a>, and <a href="http://www.elections.act.gov.au/elections_and_voting/electronic_voting_and_counting/development_of_the_system">published</a> for anyone to see on the internet. In addition, audit trails and security systems will be in place to verify that the software used in production is identical to the tested and audited software, and to verify that the data actually counted is the data cast by voters in polling places. This approach is intended to ensure that there will be no way in which electronic votes can be tampered with. The system is intended to be more transparent and secure than the existing paper ballot method." </div> Um artigo sobre isso, incluindo o Brasil, em: <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://arstechnica.com/features/2012/11/internet-based-and-open-source-how-e-voting-is-working-around-the-globe/">http://arstechnica.com/features/2012/11/internet-based-and-open-source-how-e-voting-is-working-around-the-globe/</a> Abs, Elias </body> </html>